Joanne Lin, senior fellow at Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, said it is almost certain the code will be among the new Asean chair’s top priorities due to its escalating maritime tensions with China.
While Manila will push for a legally binding code of conduct, Lin said, progress will be hindered by China and Asean’s disagreement on key issues concerning the South China Sea, such as the interpretation of international law and what activities the code should regulate.
“So, while the Philippines will inject urgency and political weight into the process, expectations must be measured. It can keep momentum alive, but major breakthroughs will depend on whether Beijing is willing to shift its longstanding negotiating position,” she told FMT.
Lin added that Asean also has to grapple with internal divisions. Given that maritime disputes are very structural in nature, finalising a legally binding agreement is unlikely in the short term, she said.
In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled that China had no basis for its territorial claims in the South China Sea.
Despite this, the major power has continued to assert sovereignty over almost the entire maritime region, leading to repeated clashes, particularly between Filipino and Chinese vessels, which have even led to collisions.
China has also encroached into parts of Malaysia’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs) near Sabah and Sarawak, including one instance last year reportedly involving three Chinese coast guard vessels near a Petronas offshore oil rig.
According to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, at least one Chinese coast guard vessel entered and operated in Malaysian waters every day between Jan 1 and Sept 27 last year.
Malaysia also faces the challenge of illegal and unregulated fishing by Vietnamese and Chinese fishing vessels in its EEZs, which some observers have said are going unreported.
Thomas Benjamin Daniel of Malaysia’s Institute of Strategic and International Studies said it is clear that more than a few Asean nations are hesitant about finalising the code, especially for fear of drawing a harsh response from Beijing.
The analyst added that all it takes for the 2026 deadline to be missed is for one Asean member state to delay or disagree with the code of conduct.
“While the code could help manage tensions in the contested South China Sea, it risks further constricting their already narrow strategic wiggle room, especially against China’s presence and dominance in the contested waters,” he said.
Outside the code of conduct, Daniel does not see Asean claimant states being able to take other steps to address territorial disputes in the South China Sea, citing a distrust among these nations “as much as they distrust China”.
“Negotiations in good faith, transparent where necessary, based on international laws and norms, will be a good start. However, I don’t really see that happening.”
Malaysia’s key role in 2026
Nevertheless, Malaysia is set to continue playing a key role in the code of conduct talks as it continues serving as the Asean-China relations coordinator until 2027.
Daniel said Malaysia will be very involved in discussions next year as it continues coordinating talks between Asean and China, with key deadlines already set.
However, he is more pessimistic on the possible outcome, saying the final document may turn out to be valuable but is likely to be “just another Asean document”, in the sense that it will only be declarative and vague.
“Time will tell,” he said, citing the various interests and distrusts at play among the nations involved.
Lin maintained that the code of conduct is still a crucial instrument for regional stability, though its form should be realistic and pragmatic.
She credited Putrajaya with being consistent and keeping the momentum of discussions alive as coordinator between Asean and China, pushing for regular talks and keeping unity amid heightened tensions.
“While no major breakthroughs emerged under its Asean chairmanship, this was largely due to structural constraints rather than a lack of effort by Malaysia, which had ensured the issue did not slip off the agenda.”
She suggested Asean pursue more modular or issue-based deals with China that could serve as tools to manage risks and incidents, such as agreements on managing incidents at sea, rules on dangerous manoeuvres and protocols for law-enforcement interactions at sea.
“These can be complemented by joint or coordinated patrols, better maritime domain awareness through shared information, and capacity-building with partners to reduce the asymmetry with China.
“The value of the code of conduct lies not only in the legal text, but in the continued relevance of Asean as a stabiliser,” Lin added.