For a mathematician, 2025 might stand out for being a “perfect square”: 45 multiplied by 45, a rare symmetry. But its significance goes far beyond numerical elegance – it marks the year the postwar global order expired, and a new one was about to be born.
Eighty years ago, as the world emerged from World War II, the victorious Western Allies designed a system intended to prevent another catastrophic conflict. The result was a global order based on three intertwined promises: geopolitical stability anchored by American leadership, industrial progress that would steadily raise living standards, and globalisation that would spread prosperity through trade and integration.
That postwar order delivered real achievements. In the West, a burgeoning middle class enjoyed political freedom and economic prosperity. Globally, hundreds of millions of people were lifted out of poverty. For a time, the direction of history seemed clear, and, particularly after the end of the Cold War, even inevitable.
But, with hindsight, we can see that the postwar order carried the seeds of its demise. Authority was concentrated within Western-led institutions that claimed to speak for the world. US hegemony often led to overreach and hubris: a generation of wars in the Middle East proved costly, and confidence in the US model’s superiority obscured the reality of domestic decay.
Globalisation entrenched a lopsided bargain. Low-cost manufacturing in poor countries allowed consumers in rich countries to buy abundantly, but at a global environmental cost. As firms in America and Europe moved their production overseas, local communities lost jobs and vitality.
At the same time, financialisation made it easier to accumulate wealth simply through speculation and stock-price inflation, further enriching the richest without delivering social value.
The 2008 financial crisis was an early warning. US policymakers stabilised the system but did not repair it. Inequality rose and politics grew angrier. By the time Donald Trump was re-elected to the US presidency, his political rise was no longer an aberration. It was the bill coming due.
The accumulated stress became impossible to ignore in 2025, particularly in the former ruling powers. Transatlantic alliances once thought permanent were ruptured. Trade wars and protectionist industrial policies signalled the end of frictionless trade. Populism in democracies revealed a deeper loss of trust in elite institutions, and immigrants became an easy scapegoat.
Add the worsening impact of climate change and it is little wonder that Western leaders and thinkers have been feeling overwhelmed by the “polycrisis”.
The term rightly describes the tangle of global dangers. But it fails to diagnose their root causes, validating fear but obscuring responsibility. It also frames Western shocks as global threats, while overlooking the agency of the rest of the world, also known as the global majority.
Rather than simply naming the death of the old, we must ask what might replace it. After all, while profound disruption carries acute risks, it also provides a rare opening for deep transformation. That is why we should view this moment not as a polycrisis, but as a “polytunity” – a generational opening for global transformation from the margins.
Some contours of the new world order – three in particular – are already visible. Geopolitically, it will be characterised by multipolarity, with the US and China as the two largest powers but neither as a single hegemon. Such a diffusion of power need not lead to chaos if non-dominant countries take more responsibility for delivering global public goods and find creative means to collaborate.
Moreover, AI will transform how humans live and work. Depending on how it is regulated and used, AI could lead to a greater concentration of power and wealth, but it could also lower barriers to knowledge and productivity – for example, through translation, tutoring, and rapid problem-solving – especially for communities long excluded from elite networks.
Lastly, globalisation will not disappear, but its form will change. Long, fragile supply chains optimised purely for efficiency are giving way to shorter, more resilient ones. Today’s developing countries can no longer count on exporting to rich markets to generate growth; instead, they must also cooperate with their neighbours and dismantle regional barriers to trade.
Whether the world seizes the polytunity or succumbs to the polycrisis depends fundamentally on mindset. Even as Western political and economic dominance wanes, Western narratives of disruption and despair continue to dominate. Yet nowhere is a mindset shift more urgent than among the global majority, which has more potential for agency today than it ever did before.
Such a mindset must be adaptive, inclusive, and moral – what I call AIM. To be adaptive is to discover and enable possibilities, not just control risks. To be inclusive is to eschew one-size-fits-all models in favour of bespoke solutions that harness indigenous knowledge and capabilities. And to be moral is to question how asymmetrical power has shaped dominant ideas and voices, while amplifying those that have historically been marginalised.
An earlier “perfect square” year was 1600, heralding the Age of Enlightenment that would transform Europe and, eventually, the world. The Enlightenment championed reason and freedom, but it also justified empire and domination – not only of the West over the rest, but also of humans over nature. We have a chance to do better: to build a more plural, more equal, and more ecologically grounded world order.
But the future that emerges after 2025 depends crucially on the worldview we choose. Lamenting the polycrisis reinforces paralysis, whereas embracing the polytunity encourages change.
Yuen Yuen Ang is professor of political economy at Johns Hopkins University, where she directs The Polytunity Project and The Multipolar World & US-China Roundtables.
The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of FMT.