The language of regret is beginning to seep into the ranks of those who once formed the cultural and political backbone of the Make America Great Again (Maga) movement.

When Tucker Carlson, an influential voice in the right-wing media, says he feels “tormented” over his support for Donald Trump, it is not merely a personal confession — it is a signal of unease within a broader ideological coalition.

When former Republican congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene offers a public apology for contributing to toxic politics, and political commentator Candace Owens admits embarrassment over her earlier backing of Trump, the cumulative effect suggests something more systemic than isolated second thoughts.

This phenomenon — often described as “buyer’s remorse” — is not unusual in politics.

What makes the current moment distinct, however, is the convergence of geopolitical shock and domestic economic pressure.

The ongoing Iran war, initiated under Trump’s renewed presidency, has introduced precisely the kind of external strain that tends to expose internal fractures.

At the heart of this potential unraveling lies the price of energy.

Historically, American voters have demonstrated a low tolerance for sustained increases in gasoline prices. When fuel costs rise, they do not remain confined to the pump.

They cascade into the broader consumer price index, raising transportation costs, food prices, and ultimately the cost of living.

What begins as a foreign policy decision in the Strait of Hormuz quickly becomes a domestic political liability in Ohio, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. The irony is striking.

A movement that prided itself on economic nationalism and domestic resilience now finds itself vulnerable to precisely the global interdependencies it once downplayed.

The Iran conflict has reinforced a fundamental truth: the United States, despite its vast energy production, remains deeply embedded in a global oil market where disruptions anywhere affect prices everywhere.

Yet, it would be premature to declare a full-scale collapse of Maga support.

Political loyalties, especially those built on identity and grievance, are rarely undone overnight.

Many supporters may reinterpret current difficulties as necessary sacrifices in a larger geopolitical struggle. Others may double down, viewing criticism from former allies as betrayal rather than reflection.

The real test, therefore, lies not in rhetorical shifts among influencers but in electoral behaviour. This is why September and November 2026 will be decisive.

As congressional elections gather momentum, polling data will begin to crystallize into something more concrete: voter intent.

It is in these months that the diffused sentiment of dissatisfaction — if it exists — will translate into either abstention, defection, or continued loyalty.

Midterm cycles in the United States have historically served as referenda on sitting administrations.

If economic pressures intensify — particularly through sustained inflation driven by energy costs — the electoral consequences could be significant.

However, if the administration manages to stabilise prices or reframe the conflict as strategically necessary, the anticipated backlash may not materialise to the extent some expect.

Beyond the United States, there are also indications that the ideological export of Maga-style politics is encountering resistance.

The recent electoral defeat of Viktor Orbán in Hungary represents more than a national political shift.

For years, Orbán had been seen as a European counterpart to Trump — a proponent of nationalist, illiberal governance that resonated with segments of the American right.

His loss therefore raises questions about the durability of this model beyond its original context.

Similarly, the cooling relationship between Trump and Giorgia Meloni reflects emerging divergences even among ideological allies.

Meloni’s alignment with Pope Leo XIV — particularly in expressing moral reservations about the Iran war — suggests that European leaders are recalibrating their positions.

Picking a fight against the Vatican is not a smart move since Catholics formed 12% of the swing votes in the US elections.

In 2020, the Biden team won the White House with 1% of the Catholic votes. The Catholics are almost always deferential to the Vatican.

Taken together, these developments point to a moment of flux in Maga’s camp rather than finality though.

Buyer’s remorse, if it is indeed taking hold, remains uneven and incomplete. Sentiments in the US have not congealed into an anti-war movement as yet which leads to the third US aircraft carrier moving into the Persian Gulf.

For now, doubts about Trump are becoming visible in elite discourse but not yet fully verified in mass political behaviour.

In the end, politics is measured not by what commentators say, but by how citizens vote.

The confessions of Carlson, Greene, and Owens may capture headlines, but they are only early indicators of a deeper process that is still unfolding.

Whether this process culminates in a meaningful shift — or merely a temporary wobble — will depend on the interplay between war, economic conditions, and electoral dynamics.

Until September or November 2026, the question of buyer’s remorse within Maga remains just that: an open question.

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of FMT.