
Jamil Ghani, a PhD candidate at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies said that while strategic caution will likely continue to guide Malaysia’s approach to defence ties with China, there are still areas where cooperation can be pursued without raising alarm.
“For Malaysia, any deepening (cooperation) would likely need to fall within very narrow and workable boundaries, such as joint training on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, anti-piracy patrols in non-contested waters, or cyber defence collaboration under a civilian-military hybrid framework.” he told FMT.
However, he said these dynamics would need to be carefully managed to avoid unsettling Malaysia’s ties with other security partners.
“The optics would need to be carefully managed to avoid undermining Malaysia’s relationships with its Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) allies, the US and even Asean members including the Philippines and Vietnam.”
The FPDA is a defensive alliance among five Commonwealth nations: Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom. Established in 1971, its primary purpose is to provide external defence support for Malaysia and Singapore.
Jamil said optics are important as Malaysia’s postures towards China in defence matters must be shaped by its broader strategic identity as a non-aligned, middle power hedger.
Malaysia, he said, continues to adopt a balanced and pragmatic approach in its defence relations—maintaining diplomatic engagement with China while addressing ongoing security concerns in the South China Sea.
“The recent January 2025 meeting between PLA Joint Staff Chief Liu Zhenli and Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim highlights Malaysia’s preference for dialogue and military diplomacy over deeper operational alignment,” he said.
This, said Jamil, aligns with preserving Malaysia’s legal claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to avoid jeopardising existing defence ties with key partners.
Deeper cooperation with China
Malaysia, Jamil said, could adopt a friendlier stance toward China if Beijing demonstrates greater restraint in areas within Malaysia’s claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ), particularly around the Luconia Shoals. He said such a gesture would serve as a vital goodwill measure.
“Without that, deeper cooperation would be politically untenable for Putrajaya, regardless of economic dependencies,” he said.
Thomas Daniel, director of foreign policy and security studies at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies said unlike the political, economic and cultural aspects of bilateral ties between the nations, defence ties have always proceeded at a more measured pace.
“China’s continued pressure and presence in Malaysia’s EEZ in the South China Sea remains a major concern for Malaysia’s defence establishment.
“Unless this threat perception changes, it is likely to hinder more substantive cooperation,” he said when contacted.
Jamil also said Malaysia had recently made notable defence procurements as part of efforts to diversify its suppliers. These acquisitions, he said, were from countries that align with its strategic preferences.
“Malaysia’s recent procurement choices—from FA-50 fighter jets from South Korea to Anka medium-altitude drones from Turkey—indicate a clear preference for middle-power partners that combine competitive pricing with political neutrality, strategic trust and opportunities for technology transfer,” said Jamil.
Last week, communications minister Fahmi Fadzil said Chinese president Xi Jinping’s visit this week was aimed at strengthening trade ties amid US-imposed tariffs, with hopes of deepening both economic cooperation and people-to-people relations.