From Julia Roknifard

Recent disruptive events in a number of regions have dramatically demonstrated that the reliability of the post-Cold War order is over and that intervention by great powers against states that have limited ability to defend themselves will become increasingly common.

While a variety of wars of choice had been waged in the past several years, the events in Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria and Greenland signal a final unambiguous end to past security assumptions.

There are claims of regime change efforts that aim to take advantage of local conditions aided by the lack of coordination between targeted states and their neighbours.

The abduction of the president of a sovereign developing state and open interference and destabilisation in another indicates the current geopolitical struggle will intensify with a liberal use of force to be expected.

For Southeast Asia and its principle grouping, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), this means greater pressure to secure supply chains, build resilience and self-sufficiency and to rethink relations with strategic partners.

The destabilisation is only expected to go on as the US continues to coerce its own Nato ally Denmark to hand over the strategic territory of Greenland, coupled with tensions in the South China Sea and First Island Chain which Taiwan is a crucial part of.

Foreign pressure on Venezuela has combined sanctions, political recognition strategies, economic isolation, and implicit regime-change signalling.

While framed as a response to governance failures and human rights concerns, the effect has been to demonstrate how economic and political pressure can be applied at scale to weaken a sovereign state without formal conflict. The result has been prolonged instability and regional spillovers of insecurity.

Meanwhile in Iran, attempts to destabilise the rial in combination with the fomentation of violent demonstrations, riding on the back of real and pressing economic problems, and other measures seem to have failed to gain momentum.

Nevertheless, a strike remains possible as US military power continues to build in the region with the notable movement of the USS Abraham Lincoln from the South China Sea towards the Middle East.

Southeast Asia is not insulated from global power shifts. The region sits strategically along some of the world’s most critical maritime routes and supply chains.

It is already facing several active internal conflicts and at least one state-to-state clash, opening up channels for foreign powers to exploit these weaknesses. Asean’s traditional reliance on neutrality, dialogue, and consensus is obviously coming under increased strain.

The grouping needs a unified approach to diplomacy and must speak and act with one voice. Recent controversy over the application of US tariffs and the resulting pressure for Asean states to make concessions on a bilateral basis exposed fracture lines instead of being used as an opportunity to face a common challenge and negotiate a single tariff rate for the region.

Ensuring Asean’s core interests

The near-term challenge is to integrate security thinking across military and non-military domains while preserving Asean’s core principles.

Security today is not solely about armed conflicts. Regime change operations exploit weaknesses, whether in economic and cost of living issues, societal and political fault lines or even military weakness and the integrity of those in charge of defending the country’s sovereignty.

The experience of Venezuela illustrates how economic tools can be weaponised to devastating effect, but many observers have noted the near complete lack of resistance by the Venezuelan armed forces against foreign aircraft leading to speculation that they had been co-opted in some way.

Asean economies, deeply interconnected with global trade and finance, are vulnerable to similar disruptions if geopolitical tensions escalate. Potential disruptions to regional economies are not hypothetical.

Sanctions and tariffs, shipping insurance constraints, financial de-risking, and export controls are disruptive to the region’s manufacturing, maritime trade, commodities and essential consumer goods whether for domestic use or export.

The challenges are varied and complex with no single Asean state being capable of facing them alone. This is why Asean must move beyond declaratory exercises towards deeper integration of its defensive and resilience capacities.

There has to be real consensus on the need to act collectively to guarantee uninterrupted maritime trade and a policy of free and open trade by avoiding any trade restrictions on behalf of external parties.

Collective interest and effort

Asean must speak with a stronger collective voice. In the run-up to the events in Venezuela there was little collective opposition to US threats against the country which the latter correctly bet on that lack of regional unity.

The same will apply to Asean. Should similar campaigns by external actors be allowed to proceed against any Asean member, the collective must make their opposition loud and unambiguous.

At the same time, Asean must also confront the reality that hard power deterrence still matters. The absence of collective defence mechanisms and limited military-industrial base leaves individual states exposed to military pressure.

Asean states need to demonstrate an ability to work in concert while ensuring that they have sufficient capability to defend against external attempts to close off waterways or build military installations without consulting the grouping.

It is likely that events will intensify in the South China Sea and that if one great power makes claims on the basis of it being a “sphere of influence” and “vital strategic interest”, it will likely draw on the intervention of one or more other great powers in response.

The only way for Asean to ensure such scenarios do not unfold is to aggressively reject such moves. There is already a basis for this through the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (Zopfan) declaration aiming to keep Southeast Asia free from external interference by fostering regional stability, non-alignment, and cooperation.

Ultimately, Asean must make the transition from a passive state to an active grouping that prioritises collective effort and preparedness with an integrated security architecture that can enforce its interests.

Diplomacy backed by capability carries weight. Diplomacy without it invites challenges.

Asean’s survival as a stable, autonomous regional grouping will depend on its willingness to adapt, integrate, and defend its interests, peacefully where possible but firmly where necessary.

Julia Roknifard is a senior lecturer at the School of Law and Governance at Taylor’s University and lectures at the newly launched programme ‘Philosophy, Politics, and Economics’.

The views shared are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of FMT.