The renewed clashes along the Thai–Cambodian border — marked by airstrikes, retaliatory artillery fire, and political accusations — has understandably raised concerns across Southeast Asia.

Yet it is important to place this relapse in the proper perspective.

While the violence between Thailand and Cambodia is serious, it is also one of many border disputes in Asean, most of which remain non-violent, well-managed, and far removed from the kind of escalation unfolding today.

Asean is a region shaped by colonial borders, shifting rivers, overlapping historical memories, and competing maritime claims.

Disputes exist almost everywhere — on land, at sea, and along riverbanks. But they rarely erupt into full confrontation. What is happening between Thailand and Cambodia is not the norm, and it should not be interpreted as evidence of a wider regional unraveling.

In fact, the escalation is the product of unique conditions tied specifically to Bangkok and Phnom Penh.

Thailand is heading toward a general election in early 2026, burdened by public pressure arising from devastating floods and governance challenges. Cambodia, meanwhile, is navigating sensitive political transitions and historical narratives tied to border sovereignty.

When both capitals are politically tense at the same moment, even small incidents — a landmine explosion, a misplaced patrol, a misinterpreted reconnaissance movement — can rapidly flare up into military action.

The geography around Preah Vihear, saturated with symbolic meaning and heavily manned positions, magnifies the risk of such escalation.

This combination of political timing, symbolic geography, and military proximity makes the Thai–Cambodian case exceptional in Asean — not representative.

Most Asean border disputes follow a very different pattern

Across Southeast Asia, border disputes typically remain non-violent because mechanisms exist — whether legal, diplomatic, or technical — to prevent miscalculations from turning kinetic.

In the case of land disputes, Thailand and Laos manage their boundaries through committees and avoid troop build-ups, while Vietnam and Cambodia resolve overlapping posts through surveys, not artillery.

Along the Mekong River, Southeast Asia’s longest, Laos and Thailand focus on shifting channels and conduct joint technical studies.

Malaysia and Indonesia handle interior river issues in Sabah-Kalimantan with policing, not militarisation.

At sea, Malaysia and Indonesia, despite tensions in Ambalat, rely on coast guards and diplomatic notes.

Singapore and Malaysia’s Pedra Branca dispute went to the International Court of Justice and never escalated militarily.

The Philippines and Malaysia disagree on Sabah historically, but both avoid provoking naval confrontation.

Overlapping claims in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand remain peacefully managed.

These disputes are real and significant, but they are conducted through procedural channels, not explosive military actions.

Asean remains a region where disagreements exist, but war does not.

Malaysia’s role must not be questioned because of one relapse

The relapse along the Thai–Cambodian border must not be misread as a failure of Malaysia’s facilitative leadership, particularly under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim.

The Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord provided a structure to de-escalate tensions, create monitoring pathways, and prevent misunderstandings from spiralling.

But no peace mechanism — whether Malaysian, Asean, or even UN-led — can prevent a clash sparked in seconds by a miscommunication along a heavily militarised frontier.

Verification teams cannot teleport to sites within minutes; they require time, access, and safety to conduct forensics.

To blame Malaysia for events that emerge from Bangkok’s election cycle, Cambodia’s political sensitivities, and the hyper-symbolism of the Dangrek mountains would be fundamentally misguided.

Malaysia’s resolve must remain intact. Its credibility in peace facilitation remains unshaken.

And Asean still depends on Malaysia to provide the diplomatic “quiet space” where dialogue continues despite battlefield noise.

Why the Thai–Cambodian relapse does not threaten Asean’s stability

Asean’s strength lies not in preventing the first shot, but in preventing the tenth. While the Thai–Cambodian situation is alarming, it does not signal systemic failure for several reasons:

• Other disputes show no signs of copycat escalation.
• No other border today carries the same layered symbolism as Preah Vihear.
• Other Asean states are not undergoing simultaneous political stress.
• Most disputes involve coast guards, police, or technical surveyors — not standing armies.
• Asean’s ability to contain disputes, maintain channels of dialogue, and prevent region-wide conflict remains solid.

One violent relapse must not label a region that has largely avoided war.

The Thai–Cambodian border relapse is serious, but it is not Asean’s new normal.

It is an exception driven by unique timing, symbolic terrain, and political vulnerability.

Most Asean border disputes remain peaceful — and that is an achievement built over decades of restraint, diplomacy, and regional interdependence.

Malaysia, under Anwar Ibrahim’s leadership, plays a central role in upholding this equilibrium.

The relapse cannot be allowed to tarnish that role.

Malaysia must stay the course. Asean needs it steady hand now more than ever.

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of FMT.