From Ibrahim M Ahmad

Recently, members and backbenchers of the unity government have grown increasingly vocal in criticising its policies, actions and proposals. On Tuesday alone, there were at least three such instances.

In two separate settings, DAP MP and transport minister Loke Siew Fook and party and parliamentary colleague Khoo Poay Tiong expressed dissatisfaction over the government’s handling of complaints against the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) — a clear attempt to reassure their party base that institutional reforms remain a priority.

Meanwhile, PKR’s Rafizi Ramli led a group of 10 MPs in raising concerns about a long-awaited constitutional amendment to separate the roles of the attorney-general (AG) and public prosecutor (PP).

This reform, promised in PH’s 2022 election manifesto, finally surfaced when the Constitution (Amendment) Bill (No. 2) 2026 (CAB 2/26) was tabled in the Dewan Rakyat on Monday.

Critics whispered that Rafizi was merely intent on being a thorn in the side of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, the PKR president. Others, however, praised the former economy minister’s meticulousness, describing him as a leader with a keen eye for detail.

Regardless of motive, the real question is whether his concerns are valid.

At the heart of the debate lies a fundamental contention. The AG — appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong on the prime minister’s recommendation — being the government’s chief legal adviser, should not simultaneously serve as PP. Such dual authority risks selective prosecution and political bias.

Examples are not hard to find, the most obvious being the incumbent AG’s unexplained decision not to pursue an ongoing corruption case against Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, which had reached the defence stage — a move that has sparked accusations of bias.

The theoretical solution is straightforward: remove the prime minister’s influence from the appointment of PP. The same argument has long been made in relation to other high-level positions, including the chief justice and the MACC chief commissioner.

CAB 2/26 proposes that the AG’s appointment be recommended by the Judicial and Legal Service Commission (JLSC).

On paper, this appears sound. Yet, most, if not all, JLSC members can trace their appointment back to the prime minister.

The Public Services Commission chairman and the AG are both appointed by the king on the advice of the prime minister. The remaining members are appointed by the king on the advice of the chief justice, whose own appointment is recommended by the prime minister.

The heavy involvement of the prime minister is neither suspicious nor unusual. After all, he is presumed to have the mandate of the people.

Rafizi and his colleagues argue that a more credible safeguard would be for the law to require a parliamentary select committee to conduct public confirmation hearings, followed by a vote in the Dewan Rakyat.

Theoretically, that would give the people a more direct say. However, the nature of politics renders that supposition more idealistic than achievable.

The confirmation hearings idea is likely premised on the US model, which on paper appears democratic. In recent times, however, Senate confirmation hearings for US Supreme Court justices, attorneys-general and other high-level public appointments have often descended into partisan spectacles.

A Malaysian version would likely face similar risks. For instance, if PAS were to gain power, is there anything that would prevent their MPs from voting in a candidate who was prepared to champion shariah principles rather than civil law, even if this went against the majority sentiment among the electorate?

Then there is the suggestion of a confirmation vote in the Dewan Rakyat. But under our Westminster model, the prime minister could still deploy party and coalition whips to secure the necessary votes for his preferred candidate. (Surely, Rafizi’s team is not suggesting that the PP’s appointment must be left to a conscience vote.)

The other reported objection appears to be to a proposed fixed seven-year tenure for the appointee.

Not much, if anything, has been said to justify the proposal. However, looking at the matter logically, it seems that its purpose was to ensure that the PP’s tenure overlaps to encompass more than one parliamentary term.

The question as to whether this is necessary is surely something that can be ironed out during discussions, and for which a compromise can be easily reached.

Rafizi and his allies’ call for a parliamentary select committee to refine the proposal presupposes that a perfect model can be found. Surely, they know that no system is foolproof.

Ultimately, every model depends on officeholders carrying out their duties in good faith and in line with the spirit and intent of the constitution — as pledged in their oath of office.

Rafizi’s call for greater scrutiny would simply result in a further delay in implementing promised reforms.

The current proposal contained in CAB 2/26 is not completely without merit. Refinements, if any, can be introduced before the bill is passed into law, consistent with well-established parliamentary procedure.

If needed, further improvements can be made even after the law is passed, as has been done on countless occasions previously.

With PAS now leading Perikatan Nasional, many Malaysians worry that parliamentary and civil discourse will take a sharper, more divisive tone.

Unity government leaders and backbenchers would do well to use the limited time they have before the next general election to deliver on promised reforms, especially the proverbial low-hanging fruit — if they hope to remain in office.

That would require them to put aside their differences and work together, not against each other.

Anything resembling mere political theatre is best done away with.

Ibrahim M Ahmad is an FMT reader.

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of FMT.