The train derailment on the Ampang-Sri Petaling LRT line on Thursday has once again exposed a serious weakness in Malaysia’s management of technical safety and emergency response involving rail operations.
Every time an accident like this happens, something deeply troubling is revealed: we simply do not have the technical depth, institutional competence and independent expertise required to properly investigate rail accidents.
We still behave like a country learning on the job, despite having operated urban rail systems for decades.
A modern railway system is not just about building tracks, buying trains and launching new stations with political fanfare.
The real test of a mature transport system is how it manages safety, investigates failures and prevents recurrence. That is where Malaysia repeatedly falls short.
There is supposed to be a rail regulator: the land public transport agency known as Agensi Pengangkutan Awam Darat (Apad). In theory, Apad exists to regulate, supervise and ensure safety standards in public transport operations.
But when incidents happen, like the one that unfortunately happened on Thursday, they appear unable to immediately mobilise and send a professional technical investigation team to the ground.
Instead, the first instinct is often bureaucratic: asking the asset owner, Prasarana or operator Rapid Rail, a Prasarana subsidiary, to prepare and submit a report explaining what happened.
That raises a fundamental question: how can the regulator depend on the regulated party to explain the failure?
In all serious rail systems around the world, the regulator and accident investigation authority would be independent of the operator.
Otherwise, the entire process risks becoming an exercise in self-investigation.
In countries with advanced rail systems such as Japan, France, China and the UK, rail accidents trigger immediate deployment of dedicated investigators, engineers, signalling specialists and safety inspectors.
They secure evidence, analyse track conditions, inspect signalling systems, review maintenance records, examine wheel assemblies, interview operators and reconstruct the sequence of failure scientifically.
In Malaysia, however, we often appear reactive, confused and overly dependent on operators themselves for technical explanations.
The uncomfortable truth is this: many of the institutions tasked with regulating rail safety are staffed largely by generalist civil servants rather than specialised railway professionals with decades of operational and engineering experience. Apad is run by generalist civil servants.
You cannot regulate a highly technical transport system, that runs from 6am to midnight, without the involvement of highly technical people around the clock.
Railways are not administrative paperwork. Railways involve signalling systems, rolling stock engineering, track geometry, traction power systems, braking systems, operational protocols and predictive maintenance regimes.
If the regulator itself lacks technical capability, how can it effectively audit operators? How can it independently verify maintenance quality? How can it identify early warning signs before failures happen?
This is precisely why Malaysia continues to struggle with institutional accountability.
Everyone waits for someone else to produce a report. Everyone passes responsibility upwards or sideways.
Nobody appears empowered or technically capable enough to immediately take command of an accident investigation with authority and confidence. And this is not merely about one derailment.
Damaging public confidence
Every rail accident erodes public confidence in the transport system. Malaysians are already heavily dependent on private vehicles because many people do not fully trust the reliability, connectivity and safety of public transport.
Incidents like this reinforce that distrust.
The irony is painful. We keep talking about reducing traffic congestion, lowering carbon emissions and encouraging people to shift from private cars to public transport.
Yet public transport systems can only succeed if the public believes they are safe, professionally managed and technically reliable.
Safety is no longer a public relations exercise. It is not solved by issuing press statements or forming another committee after an accident.
Safety requires deep ministerial competence and commitment. It requires continuous investment in technical expertise and an independent culture of accountability.
As we build more rail systems, we urgently need a truly independent rail accident investigation body staffed with professional railway engineers, signalling experts and operational investigators, not merely administrative officers.
We need a transport safety culture that prioritises technical excellence rather than bureaucratic compliance.
Otherwise, every accident will continue to follow the same predictable cycle: incident, confusion, press conference, internal report, temporary outrage and eventual silence -— until the next accident happens, and we go through the same rigmarole all over again.
The author can be reached at: [email protected].
The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of FMT.